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Executive Summary
Interest in the role of entrepreneurial entry in innovation raises the question
about the extent to which tax policy encourages or discourages entry. We
find that, while the level of the marginal tax rate has a negative effect on entre-
preneurial entry, the progressivity of the tax also discourages entrepreneur-
ship, and significantly so for some groups of households. These effects are
traceable principally to the "upside," or "success," convexity of the household
tax schedule.
Prospective entrants from a priori innovative industries and occupations are
no less affected by the considerations we examine than are other prospective
entrants. In terms of destination-based industry and occupation measures of
innovative entrepreneurs, we find mixed evidence on whether innovative
entrepreneurs differ from the general population. The results for entrepreneurs
moving to innovative industries suggest that they may be unaffected by tax
convexity, but the possible endogeneity of this measure of innovative entrepre-
neurs confounds interpreting this specification. Using education as a measure
of potential for innovation, we find that tax convexity discourages entry into
self-employment for people of all educational backgrounds. Overall, we find
little evidence that the tax effects are focused simply on the employment
changes of less-skified or less-promising potential entrants.
I.Introduction
Public policy interest in entrepreneurs reflects several considerations,
from the role of entrepreneurs in innovative activity to the significance
of entrepreneurship in wealth accumulation (Gentry and Hubbard
2004a), to the relationship between entrepreneurship and income and
wealth mobility (Quadrini 1999). Entrepreneurship can take many
forms, ranging from small mom-and-pop operations to larger firms
backed by venture capital. Naturally, some entrepreneurial enterprises88 Gentry and Hubbard
are more innovative than others; for example, some entrepreneurs
open restaurants that closely follow existing business models, while
other entrepreneurs develop new computer software. Despite the wide
range of entrepreneurial activities and their varied contributions to in-
novation, entrepreneurship is typically a risky business.'
The risk entailed in entrepreneurship amplifies public policy con-
cerns about whether the government can (or should) foster innovation
and entrepreneurship. In addition to specific policies toward entrepre-
neurship, the tax system can potentially have positive and negative
effects on entrepreneurship. Some tax policies, such as accelerated cap-
ital recovery for small businesses, target entrepreneurs, but other tax
effects may arise from general tax policy choices, such as the choice of
the shape of the tax rate schedule. Given the riskiness of entrepreneur-
ship, the shape of the tax schedule may play an especially important
role in affecting entrepreneurial decisions because, with a progressive
income, successful ventures may face a higher tax rate than unsuccess-
ful ventures face.
In our previous work (Gentry and Hubbard 2003), we focus on the
effect of the progressivity of the income tax schedule on the entry
decisions of risk-averse potential entrepreneurs. On one hand, when
greater tax progressivity can offer insurance through the tax system
against uninsured idiosyncratic risk, entry may be enhanced (see, for
example, Kanbur 1981). On the other hand, the "success tax" feature of
a progressive tax combined with imperfect loss offsets can reduce the
likelihood of entry. As we discuss more fully below, our focus on the
progressivity of the tax system departs from earlier research on taxa-
tion and entrepreneurship that mainly focuses on how the level of
taxation affects entrepreneurial activity.
In our previous (2003) study, using data from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID), we estimated the effects of tax progres-
sivity (while controlling for the level of taxation) in empirical estima-
tions of the probability of entry into self-employment.2 We found
robust results that progressive marginal tax rates discourage entry into
self-employment and business ownership. Those effects are large. The
Omnibus Budget Reconcffiation Act of 1993, which raised the top mar-
ginal individual income tax rate, was estimated to have reduced the
probabffity of entry into self-employment for upper-middle-income
households by as much as 20 percent. Those estimated effects were ro-
bust to controUing for differences in family structure, spousal income,
and measures of transitory income."Success Taxes," Entrepreneurial Entiy, and Innovation 89
An open question fri this research is, Do theestimated negative
effects of tax progressivity on entrepreneurshiptranslate into negative
effects on innovation? That is,we do not know whether the tax system
discourages entry by potential entrepreneurs whoare especially inno-
vative by more or less than it discouragesentry by potential entrepre-
neurs who want to pursue projects that are not terribly innovativeor
risky. It is possible that risk and innovationare positively correlated,
so that entrepreneurs with more innovative projectsare more con-
cerned with the success tax from progressivetax rates compared to
entrepreneurs who undertake safer, less innovativeprojects. It is also
possible, however, that tax factors play less ofa role for innovative
entrepreneurs because of the relative importance of otherfactors domi-
nating the entry decision.
We do not have a directmeasure on how innovative are particular
entrants into entrepreneurship. As an indirect test of whetherthe tax
system discourages particularly innovative types ofentrepreneurship,
we examine whether our estimated effectsvary by characteristics of
the potential entrepreneur that might plausiblybe correlated with how
innovative his or her projectmay be. As characteristics that might be
correlated with how innovative the potentialentrepreneur is, we focus
on the potential entrepreneur's education, industry, and occupation.
Our underlying assumption is that better-educatedentrepreneurs are
more likely to be innovative than are less-educated potentialentrepre-
neurs. In terms of industry and occupation, weassume that more tech-
nical industries and occupations (as opposedto, say, service industries
and occupations) are more innovative forms ofentrepreneurship. We
use industry and occupation in two ways to proxy for how innovative
the entrepreneur is. First,we use the potential entrepreneur's industry
and occupation at the time of the decisionas measures of his or her
predetermined characteristics;we call this the "origin" basis for defin-
ing innovation as a characteristic. Second,we identify innovative entre-
preneurs based on their "destination" industry and occupation; thatis,
we test whether entry into self-employment in innovative industriesor
occupations is differentially sensitive to tax incentives.
To preview our results,we find some evidence that our estimated
effects of tax progressivity discouragingentry into entrepreneurship
vary with our proxies for how innovative the potentialentrepreneur
is. In most cases, the sensitivity to the taxparameters does not vary
systematically with our industry and occupationmeasures of how in-
novative the entrepreneur is. We foundone notable exception: while90 Gentry and Hubbard
the benchmark estimated effect of tax convexityis negative, entrepre-
neurs who enter into innovativeindustries are essentially unaffected
by convexity of the tax system. We also findthat the estimated effects
suggest that the negative effect of taxprogressivity is larger (in abso-
lute value) for people with more than a collegedegree, but these esti-
mated effects are not statistically different from theestimated effects
for other education groups. Overall, however,the results suggest that
potential entrepreneurs in innovative industriesand occupations are
less likely to enter self-employment than arepotential entrepreneurs in
other industries and occupations, thoughthese differences are only
marginally statistically significant. One explanation forthese negative
effects is that the activities that we define asinnovative tend to be
undertaken in relatively large organizations.
One overall lesson from our results is that theshape of the tax sched-
ule can have substantial effects on whetherindividuals undertake risky
investments. The interactions with measuresof innovative occupations
and industries do not reveal that these largeeffects are either more or
less likely in such activities. This possibledistortion from nonlinear tax
schedules is not commonly included in discussionsof designing tax
schedules; the size of our estimated effects and the importanceof entre-
preneurship in the economy suggests that this omission maybe impor-
tant. If the estimated responsiveness tononlinearities in tax schedules
by individuals carries over to corporate investment,then loss-offset
rules and other features of the corporate tax systemthat create non-
linearities may generate larger distortions in investmentthan previous
estimates suggest.
This paper is organized as follows. Section IIbriefly surveys previ-
ous empirical work onthe effects of taxation on entrepreneurship. Sec-
tion III describes our basic empiricalspecification of the link between
progressivity and entry and describes the data. We presentempirical
results in Section IV. Section V concludes.
II.Taxation and Entrepreneurship
Tax policy can affect entrepreneurship andinnovation through various
channels. Broadly speaking, these channels can becategorized as the
effects of general tax policies (such as a change inmarginal tax rates)
and targeted tax policies (such as a tax creditfor research). In assessing
how general tax policies affect entrepreneurship,the critical question
is, Why would the tax policy have adifferential effect on entrepreneur-"Success Taxes," Entrepreneurial Entry, and Innovation 91
ship relative to other economic activity (e.g., otheroccupation or in-
vestment choices)? For targeted tax policies, the policy designquestion
is, Can the policy encourage the desired behavior withoutproviding
subsidies to projects that would have taken place withoutthe targeted
policy?
One common hypothesis regarding the differentialeffects of tax
rates on self-employment (one measure of entrepreneurship)and
working for someone else is that higher taxrates encourage self-
employment because it provides tax-sheltering opportunities.3These
tax-sheltering opportunities include both tax evasion (i.e.,it is rela-
tively easy to underreport self-employment income)and tax avoidance
(e.g., legal opportunities to deduct business-relatedconsumption from
one's taxable income).4 The value of these tax-shelteringopportunities
increases with the tax rate, which leads to the hypothesisthat higher
tax rates increase the level of self-employment in theeconomy. Previ-
ous empirical tests of this hypothesis have yielded mixed results, but
the bulk of the evidence suggestsa positive relationship between tax
rates and self-employment.5
The tax-sheltering hypothesis providesone channel for general tax
policies to affect the decision to bean entrepreneur. In a series of
papers, Carroll, Holtz-Eakin, Rider, and Rosen (2000a, 2000b, and
2001) examine a separate line of inquiry regarding therole of tax rates
and entrepreneurship. Their goal has beento assess whether taxes af-
fect the ongoing decisions of entrepreneurs. Theyexamine the effects
of the tax reforms of the 1980s on the investment andhiring decisions
of small businesses and on small-business income growth.These
reforms, which reduced marginal tax rates, coulddifferentially affect
small-business investment and hiring for severalreasons. First, the tax
rate reductions for noncorporate businesseswere larger than the tax
rate reductions for corporate businesses. Second, if theproduction
functions for small businesses include complementaritiesbetween the
owner's effort and the use of other factors (i.e., capitalor hired work-
ers), then any tax effects on the labor supply ofexisting entrepreneurs
can affect their purchase of other factors. Carroll, Holtz-Eakin, Rider,
and Rosen find that higher tax rates reduce investment,hiring, and
small-business income growth.
A third channel for general tax policies to affectentrepreneurship
arises because entrepreneurship is riskier than otheroccupational
choices and because innovative investmentsare riskier than other pos-
sible investments. Thus, tax policies that affect thereturns from taking92 Gentry and Hubbard
risks can have consequences for entrepreneurship.Because the returns
from entrepreneurship are relatively risky, the levelof the marginal tax
rate is unlikely to capture the completeeffect of tax policy on entrepre-
neurship (see Cullen and Gordon 2002, and Gentryand Hubbard
2003).6 To understand this concept, consider the example of a propor-
tional tax on entry by a risk-neutral individual. Because aprospective
entrant would pay the same rate of tax onearnings from work for a
firm and earnings from self-employment, selection intoentrepreneur-
ship would be independent of taxconsiderations.7 When investment is
risky, the tax effects may depend on the overall shapeof the tax sched-
ule, which is not captured by a local measure of themarginal tax rate.
Thus, nonlinearities in the tax system canaffect decisions. Our previ-
ous research emphasizesthis point, as do the results we present below.
Imperfect loss-offset provisions provide another exampleof how rel-
atively risky projects face a higher tax burden thanrelatively safe proj-
ects face. Rather than focusing on the riskinessof occupational choices,
the analysis of loss-offset provisions usually focuses oncorporate in-
vestment.8 For corporations, reporting negative taxable income does
not necessarily generate a tax refund.Instead, corporations benefit
from losses in one year by applying a set of tax-losscarryback and
carryforward rules; these rules specify a limited time period overwhich
corporations can essentially average their income.These rules create
another form of "success tax" in the tax code, wherebysuccessful firms
face a higher tax rate than unsuccessful firmsface. In the extreme, if a
corporation has negative taxable income in a year butdoes not have
sufficient positive income during the carryback orcarryforward pe-
riod, then it faces a tax rate of zero on the losses; however,had the cor-
poration been successful, it might face the top corporate taxrate of 35
percent. Altshuler and Auerbach (1990) andGraham (1996) discuss
how these loss-offset rules can affect corporate investmentand financ-
ing decisions.9
Capital gains taxation provides a final channelthrough which gen-
eral tax policy can affect entrepreneurship. Ifentrepreneurial activity
inherently generates more of its income as capital gainsrelative to
other employment or investment choices, thenlower capital gains tax
rates may increase entrepreneurialactivity.'0 These capital gains tax
effects are often discussed in the context of the taxationof venture cap-
ital. Poterba (1989) has stressed that the ability of entrepreneursto shift
some of their labor returns fromordinary income to less heavily taxed
capital gains income encourages entrepreneurial ventures;in addition,"Success Taxes," Entrepreneurial Entry, and Innovation 93
the capital gains tax can affect the supply ofventure capital to startup
firms.'1
By definition, these effects of general tax policieson entrepreneur-
ship are not the main objectives of the tax policyprocess. Presumably,
general tax policies are set based on broad policy goals,and the effects
on entrepreneurship are only part of the overall effects of tax policy.
Nonetheless, given the importance of entrepreneurshipto the overall
economy, the effects on entrepreneurship could bean important part
of the overall effects of tax policy, especially if theeffects on entrepre-
neurship are large.
In contrast to the effects of general tax policieson entrepreneurship,
specific tax policies can be targeted at small businesses andinnovation.
Such targeted tax policies include: (1) tax credits forresearch and
development,12 (2) favorable depreciation rules for thecapital expendi-
tures of small businesses, (3) reduced capital gains taxes after theinitial
public offerings of qualified small-business stock,'3 and(4) preferential
exemptions for business assets under the estate tax. Thegoals of these
policies are aimed at promoting specific aspects ofentrepreneurship or
solving problems associated with taxing small businesses.For small
businesses, Slemrod (2003) argues that thesetax preferences may offset
the high tax compliance costs relative to businesssize that small busi-
nesses face.
III.Description of Tests and Data
In a perfect world, tests of the effects of tax policyon entrepreneurship
would use household-level panel data, with informationon employ-
ment, entrepreneurial status and capital, andmeasures of the shape of
the tax schedule over both households and time. Thehurdle for mea-
suring the relevant shape of the income tax schedule ishigh because
the measure of progressivity depends bothon provisions of the tax
code and the ex ante distribution ofoutcomes in entrepreneurship.
While the former is common across households, householdshave
access to quite different entrepreneurial opportunities. To link thepo-
tential tax policy effects to innovation,we need a measure of how inno-
vative the different entrepreneurial opportunitiesare.
We use data from the PSID, relyingon self-employment of the
head of the household as an indicator of entrepreneurship.'4Self-
employment is one of many potentialmeasures of entrepreneurship.
Our choice of looking at self-employmentrather thansome measure94 Gentry and Hubbard
of business ownership or investmentis that ourempirical methodol-
ogy is based on householdcharacteristics and we need panel data on
a large sample ofhouseholds.'5 A possible criticism of studying self-
employment is that it does not necessarily captureinnovative activity
that might be concentrated in a small number ofentrepreneurial firms.
Our methodology cannot be adapted easily to concentrate onsmall
corporations, but at a general level, our framework testswhether deci-
sion makers respond to nonlinearities in the tax system.An open ques-
tion is, Can the responsiveness that we estimatefor individuals
entering into self-employment be generalized to comment onhow
executives in somewhat larger firms respond tononlinearities in the
tax schedule?
Our data cover the period 1979-1993. We start in 1979because our
source for variation in state tax ratesbegins in the late 1970s; our data
end in 1993 because it is the last year of finalrelease data from the
PSID. We include in the sample heads of householdsbetween the ages
of eighteen and sixty who are in the workforce inconsecutive years.
We pool in the sample single men and women andmarried heads of
households; to avoid issues of the endogeneity of labor-forceparticipa-
tion, we excluded married women. Because entry isthe object of our
attention, our sample is based on working for someoneelse (without
any self-employment) inthe first of the consecutive years for each
observation. Entry, then, is represented by the householdreporting
self-employment income in year t + 1. On average for oursample, 3.1
percent of households enter self-employmenteach year, with the re-
mainder continuing to work for someone else.
To model entry into entrepreneurship, we estimate aprobit model
for the choice of each household head i at time t + 1:
ENTRY,t+, =f(e,Xt,Zt,Yt,TAX1)
where e represents educational attainment, x is anindividual's earn-
ings potential as an employee, z capturesdemographic differences
across households, TAX includes anindividual's marginal tax rate and
a measure of the convexity of the taxschedule faced by the individual
as an entrepreneurial entrant(described below), and y reflects time-
specific macroeconomic factors.
More specifically, we represent educational statuswith indicator
variables for less than high school education, some college,college,
and some postcollege education.'6 As basic controls for the opportu-
nity cost of entry, we include the level and squarelabor earnings of"Success Taxes," Entrepreneurial Entry, and Innovation 95
the head of the household in year t.17 We also includeas a proxy for
wealth (reflecting the effects of access to capital on entry) interest and
dividend income.'8 Finally, we control for the level andsquare of the
spouse's labor earnings in year t (assigning values ofzero for single
households).
Variables in z include the number of children in the household,
as well as dummy variables for five-year age ranges for the head;
whether the head is nonwhite, female, single,a homeowner, and living
outside a standard metropolitan statistical area; and whether the head
experienced a marital transition during the year (asa result of
marriage, divorce, or death of a spouse). For x, we includecensus-
region-specific year dummy variables to capture trends in entry deci-
sions or effects of aggregate conditions. Summary statistics for these
non-tax-related control variables are provided in table 4.1.
Tax variables present several challenges. To construct marginal tax
rates, we use the TAXSIM model of the National Bureau of Economic
Research (see Feenberg and Coutts 1993). For the household'spre-
dicted future marginal tax rate, we use household characteristics in
year t, and we project the tax rate using the year t + 1 tax
The other tax variable central to analysis is the measure of the
convexity of the tax schedule confronting prospective entrepreneurs.
Following our earlier work (Gentry and Hubbard 2003),we use the
observed distribution of three-year real-wage growth for entrants into
self-employment to capture the range of successful and unsuccessful
outcomes for entrants. Based on these outcomes, we calculate the mar-
ginal tax rates that an entrepreneur would face at various levels ofsuc-
cess. Using the observed distribution, we form weighted averages of
these marginal tax rates for successful and unsuccessful entrepre-
neurial outcomes. This measure of convexity has a value of zero if the
marginal tax rate is constant over the range of potential outcomes.
Nonzero values occur when entrepreneurial successor failure changes
the household's marginal tax rate. In taking this approach,we are
relating the distribution of potential entrepreneurial success tooppor-
tunity cost measured by current income. We assume that the variabil-
ity of the distribution of rewards to entrepreneurial activity is constant
in percentage terms across households.2°
Specifically, guided by the three-year real-wage growth experience
of entrants, we consider four possible successful outcomes by entrants,
in which labor income increases by 25 percent (with probability 0.4), 50
percent (with probability 0.4), 100 percent (with probability 0.15),oraOur sample pools data from 1978 to 1993. The number of observations is 53,151. The
sample includes households for which the head works for someone else in year t and
is not out of the labor force in t +1. We include only those households whose age is
between eighteen and sixty and whose labor income is positive in t. We drop all observa-
tions with average or marginal tax rates larger than 75 percent or smaller than -20 per-
cent. We also drop observations with average or marginal tax rates for the successful or
the unsuccessful case larger than 75 percent or smaller than -20 percent. The sample is
weighted to reflect oversampling of low-income households.
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSm).







28.29 11.04 -18.85 69.45
Marginal tax rate convexity
measure (percentage)
8.98 5.25 -15.09 49.34
Average tax rate
(percentage)
16.22 7.50 -19.83 61.51
Average tax rate convexity
measure (percentage)
7.03 2.50 -17.18 21.47
Head's labor earnings ($) 26,249 19,807 30 550,000
Spouse's labor earnings ($) 5,882 10,099 0 240,000
Dividend and interest
income ($)
768.17 2,951.49 0 145,000
Other property income ($) 633.79 4,352.49-111,000 250,000
Age (years) 36.07 10.24 18 60
Minority (nonwhite = 1) 0.15 0.35 0 1
Female head 0.23 0.42 0 1
Married (single = 1) 0.40 0.49 0 1
Number of children 0.92 1.15 0 9
Homeowner (yes = 1) 0.60 0.49 0 1
Rural (yes = 1) 0.39 0.49 0 1
Less than high school 0.15 0.36 0 1
High school 0.38 0.48 0 1
Some college 0.21 0.41 0 1
College 0.18 0.39 0 1
Some post-college education 0.080 0.27 0 1"Success Taxes," Entrepreneurial Entry, and Innovation 97
200 percent (with probability 0.05). Similarly,we consider four possi-
ble unsuccessful outcomes for entrants, in which labor incomefalls by
10 percent (with probabffity 0.5), 25 percent (with probability0.3), 50
percent (with probability 0.15), and 75 percent (with probability
0.05).21 Our basic convexitymeasure is the difference between the
weighted average of the marginal tax rates if theentrant is successful
and the weighted average of the marginal taxrates if the entrant is
unsuccessful.
In principle, convexity need not be positively correlatedwith the
level of the marginal tax rate or with income. Indeed,convexity
depends on tax provisions that varyacross households within a state,
across similar households in different states, and over time. Aswe dis-
cuss in our (2003) paper, the most important source of variation in tax
convexity is the household's location on the tax schedule, whichis
determined by sources of income other than the head ofhousehold's
labor income (e.g., spousal income).22
Our (2003) paper showed that the relationship betweenentry and
household income is U-shaped, with higher entry probabilities forthe
lowest and highest income groups than for middle-incomehouseholds.
This pattern implies that one must control carefully forhousehold in-
come so that non-tax-related variation in entry probabilitiesacross in-
come groups is not assigned to tax considerations alone.
To ]ink these tax effects to Innovation,we interact the tax variables
with measures of whether a potential entrepreneur is innovative.As
proxies for innovative entrepreneurs, we use informationon what in-
dustry or occupation the potential entrepreneuris working in when
deciding whether to become self-employed. Our choices ofinnovative
industries and occupations are somewhat arbitrary, ofcourse, but we
lacked data on our research and development (R&D) intensityor other
proxies that could be matched to industry or occupationalcategories in
PSID. Our definition of innovative industries includesthe following:
machinery (including electrical), transportationequipment, scientific
instruments, chemicals and allied products, petroleum andcoal, rub-
ber and plastics, commercial research, development andtesting labs,
and computer programming services. These industriesaccount for 13.8
percent of the observations in our sample. Overall, workers in these
industries are less likely to enter self-employment. Theentry rate
among workers in these industries is 2.02 percent, compared withan
entry rate of 3.47 percent for workers in other industries.
Our definition of innovative occupations includescomputer special-
ists, engineers, life and physical scientists, operations andsystems98 Gentry and Hubbard
researchers, science teachers at the college and universitylevel, and
engineering and science technicians. The occupations accountfor 7.8
percent of our sample. As with our innovativeindustries, the entry
rate is lower for these occupations than for otheroccupations (2.16 per-
cent compared to 3.38 percent).
These definitions of innovative potential assumethat a worker's
industry or occupation in year t reflects the chancethat he or she
wifi undertake an innovative activity conditional onentering self-
employment. The entry decision could, however, involve achange in
either industry or occupation, and this change could be intosomething
more or less innovative than theentrant's previous industry and occu-
pation. As an alternative measure of innovativeindustry or occupa-
tion, we use the individual's industry or occupationin year t + 1. For
entrants into self-employment, this measurewill capture the industry
or occupation in which they areself-employed. For innovative indus-
tries, we use the same definitions as above. For innovativeoccupations,
however, we exclude college and university scienceteachers as innova-
tive destinations for the self-employed.23 Werefer to these proxies for
innovative industries and occupations asdestination-based because
they reflect the industry or occupation into which an entrant moves;in
contrast, we refer to the proxies based on year tvariables as origin-
based because they capture the field in which thepotential entrant
starts.
The destination-based proxies for innovative industriesand occupa-
tions have an important statistical disadvantagerelative to the origin-
based measures because they are endogenous. Forexample, if the tax
system discourages entry into particularindustries or occupations,
then the data will have fewer such observationsand we wifi not iden-
tify the people who were discouraged from entering.Given this endo-
geneity, the results using the destination-based measuresshould be
interpreted with caution.
As we discuss below, we also allow the estimatedeffects of the tax
system to vary with the individual's levelof education. In these specifi-
cations, we interpret the level of education as a proxyfor the probabil-
ity that the new entrepreneur wifi undertake aninnovative activity.
IV.Empirical Results
We report our basic results in table 4.2. The firstcolumn of results of
table 4.2 (Base case) presents estimates of aprobit model for entrepre-
neurial entry in which the nontax and tax variablesdescribed in Sec-"Success Taxes," Entrepreneurial Entry, and Innovation 99
Table 4.2
Effects of tax rates and tax convexity on ently decisionsa
a The sample has 53,151 observations. Thereported coefficients are the marginal effects
from a probit regression. An asterisk (*) denotes coefficient estimates thatare statistically
different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level, anda dagger (t) denotes coefficient
estimates that are statistically different from zero at the 99 percent confidence level. The
last four columns reflect different definitions of innovative-by industryor occupation-
using year t or year t + 1 data. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Theregressions
also include the following covariates: labor earnings and labor earningssquared for
the head of household; labor earnings and labor earnings squared for thespouse (or
zero for unmarried individuals); dividend and interest income; other property income;
dummy variables for five-year age ranges; number of children; dummyvariables for
race, female-headed households, single, became married during the year, became
divorced during the year, spouse passed away during theyear, homeownership, lived
outside a standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA), less thana high school educa-
tion, some college education, college graduate, and post-college education; andcensus-
region-year effects.
tion III are included as explanatory variables, but interactionswith the
measures of being innovative are not included. We report estimated
marginal effects, accompanied by robust standarderrors that allow for
intertemporal correlation for observations from thesame household.
These base case results are consistent withour earlier work (Gentry
and Hubbard 2003). For the tax variables, the estimatedeffect at the
level of the marginal tax rate on the probability ofentry is negative
(-0.000314) and statistically different fromzero at the 95 percent confi-
dence level.24 Note that the sign of the estimated coefficient isnot con-
sistent with the argument that high tax rates stimulateentry to take








(0.000147) (0.000146) (0.000145) (0.000146) (0.000134)
Tax convexity-0.00173k -0.00170 _0.00168t _0.00171t -0.00169k
(0.000240) (0.000237) (0.00024) (0.000241) (0.000230)
Tax rate,* 0.000416 0.000782 0.000121 0.00134k
innovative (0.000527) (0.000530) (0.000333) (0.000368)
Tax 0.000325 0.000160 0.000248 0.0017S
convexity,*
innovative
(0.000933) (0.000936) (0.000652) (0.000666)
Dummy -0.0217 _0.0259* -0.0158 _0.038Ot
variable for
innovative
(0.00777) (0.00486) (0.00718) (0.00311)
Pseudo-R2 0.0779 0.0804 0.0811 0.0807 0.0884100 Gentry and Hubbard
the marginal tax spread, however, is negative(-0.00173) and statisti-
cally significantly different from zero at the 99 percentlevel. Consistent
with the "success tax" prediction and inconsistentwith the insurance
prediction, convexity of the tax schedule decreases thelikelthood of
entrepreneurial entry, all else being equal.25
As a way of interpreting this estimated coefficient,consider a five-
percentage-point reduction in convexity (which isroughly a one
standard-deviation reduction in the convexity measure).This reduc-
tion would increase the entry probability by 0.86 percentagepoints;
given a baseline entry probability of 3.2 percent, thisreduction in con-
vexity would increase the entry rate by about 25 percent.Hence, the
estimated effect of tax convexity is economically significant.
In the second through fifth columns of table 4.2, weinvestigate how
the estimated tax effects vary across noninnovative andinnovative
potential entrants. The second and third columns of table 4.2 report
results for potential entrants from innovative occupations ormoving
to innovative occupations, respectively. Thefourth and fifth columns
of table 4.2 report results with innovative defined based onindustry on
an origin and on a destinationbasis, respectively. Across all of the
specifications, the baseline coefficient estimates for thelevel and con-
vexity of the tax system are similar to those reported inthe first col-
umn. The interaction terms are notstatistically significant in three of
the four columns; these results suggest thatinnovative potential
entrants are not affected by the tax incentivesdifferentially than are
other potential entrants.
The one exception to this pattern is when we defineinnovative based
on the occupation for year t + 1,which is the occupation into which the
entrant moves. In this case, the estimated effectsof the interactions on
the level of the tax rate and the convexity of the tax system areposi-
tive. The overall effect of the tax incentivesfor these groups is the sum
of the estimated coefficients with and without the interaction.For ex-
ample, tax convexity appears to have little overalleffect on entry into
the innovative occupations based on adding togetherthe estimated co-
efficient on tax convexity (-0.00169) and the estimatedcoefficient on
the interaction term (0.00175). As mentioned above, thedestination-
based results should be interpreted with caution becausethe observed
year t + 1 occupation is endogenous tothe entry decision.26
Following our (2003) paper, we break our convexity into two parts.
The first part is the difference between the averagemarginal tax rate
on successful entrepreneurial outcomesand the benchmark tax rate;"Success Taxes," Entrepreneurial Entry, andInnovation ioi
we refer to this part as upside convexity. The secondpart is the differ-
ence between the benchmark tax rate and theaverage marginal tax rate
on unsuccessful outcomes; we refer to this partas downside convexity.
Intuitively, the notion of aconvex tax system creating a success tax
is more related to upside convexity thanto downside convexity. To
examine whether potential entrepreneurs responddifferently to the
shape of the tax schedule aboveversus below their benchmark tax
rate, we allow the estimated effects of taxconvexity to vary between
upside and downside convexity. We alsoexplore whether the effects
of upside and downside convexity differ withour proxies for irinova-
tive potential entrepreneurs.
Table 4.3 reports the results from decomposingthe tax convexity
effect into upside and downside convexity.The format of table 4.3 fol-
lows that of table 4.2, with the columnscontaining different definitions
of innovative potential entrepreneurs. Asin our earlier work (Gentry
and Hubbard 2003), the negative estimatedeffect of upside tax con-
vexity is roughly twice the size of thenegative estimated effect of
downside convexity, although bothestimated effects are statistically
different from zero at the 99 percent confidencelevel. Turning to the
interactions with innovative occupations, theestimated coefficients on
the interaction terms are small and impreciselyestimated, suggesting
that the effects of tax convexity donot differ across our categories of
occupations. The same result holds whenwe define innovative using
the potential entrepreneur's industry oforigin. When we define innova-
tive using the destination industry, theestimated coefficients on the
interactions roughly offset the estimated effect ofthe main tax variable;
however, this offsetappears to be stronger for downside convexity
than it is for upside convexity,suggesting that upside convexitymay
still have a negative effecton entry decisions.
As another a priori measure of how innovativea potential entrepre-
neur may be, we consider how the estimated tax effectsvary by educa-
tion groups.27 Education might be correlatedwith the responsiveness
to tax convexity, especially if the motives forentrepreneurial entry
vary by education groups. For example, entrants with lowskifi levels
or low educational levels may be pushed intoself-employment by a
spell of unemployment, while high-skillentrants may enter with the
explicit goal of creating wealth. If workers with fewskills (as measured
by low educational attainment) driveour main results, then one might
be tempted to infer that the estimatedtax effects are unrelated to in-
novative entrepreneurship.102 Gentry and Hubbard
Table 4.3
Comparison of upside and downside tax convexityeffects on entry decisionsa
aThe sample has 53,151 observations. The reported coefficients arethe marginal effects
from a probit regression. An asterisk(*) denotes coefficient estimates that are statistically
different from zero at the 95 percent confidencelevel, and a dagger (t) denotes coefficient
estimates that are statistically different from zero atthe 99 percent confidence level. The
last four columns reflect different definitionsof innovative-by industry or occupation-
using year t or year t + 1 data. Robust standard errors arein parentheses. The regressions
also include the following covariates: labor earningsand labor earnings squared for
the head of household; labor earningsand labor earnings squared for the spouse (or
zero for unmarried individuals);dividend and interest income; other property income;
dummy variables for five-year age ranges; numberof children; dummy variables for
race, female-headed households,single, became married during the year, became
divorced during the year, spouse passed away duringthe year, homeownership, lived
outside a standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA),less than a high school educa-








Tax rate O.00O494 -0.00O495-0.0005l4 -O.00O488 -0.0OO507
(0.000155) (0.000154) (0.000153) (0.000154) (0.000145)
Upside tax _O.00227 O.00223 -0.0O226 O.00229 _0.002181
convexity (0.000294) (0.000294) (0.000293) (0.000298) (0.000284)
Downside tax-O.0011O -O.00lO9 0OOlO2 _00lflO5 000113
convexity (0.000305) (0.000303) (0.000304) (0.000306) (0.000295)
Tax rate* 0.000351 0.000955 0.000194 O.00l23
innovative (0.000581) (0.000553) (0.000356) (0.000363)
Upside tax 0.000044 0.000128 0.000853 0.00143
convexity*
innovative
(0.00112) (0.00140) (0.000870) (0.000921)
Downside tax 0.000570-0.00104 -0.000375 0.00207*
convexity*
innovative
(0.00122) (0.00130) (0.000957) (0.000908)
Dummy -0.0207 -O.O271 -0.0171 _O.O372t
variable for
innovative
(0.00878) (0.00440) (0.00713) (0.00305)
Pseudo-R2 0.0791 0.0816 0.0825 0.0820 0.0895"Success Taxes," Entrepreneurial Entry, and Innovation 103
Table 4.4
Effects of tax rates and tax convexity on entry decisions,by educational attaimnenta
aThe sample has 53,151 observations. The pseudo-R2is 0.0785. For the education dummy
variables, high school education is the omittedcategoiy. The reported coefficients are
the marginal effects from a probit regression. Anasterisk (*) denotes coefficient esti-
mates that are statistically different from zero at the 95percent confidence level, and a
dagger(t)denotes coefficient estimates that are statistically differentfrom zero at the
99 percent confidence level. Robust standarderrors are in parentheses. The regressions
also include the following covariates: labor earningsand labor earnings squared for the
head of household; labor earnings and labor earningssquared for the spouse (or zero
for unmarried individuals); dividend and interestincome; other property income;
dummy variables for five-year ageranges; number of children; dummy variables for
race, female-headed households, single, married during theyear, divorced during the
year, spouse passed away during the year, homeownership, and livedoutside a standard
metropolitan statistical area (SMSA); and census-region-yeareffects.
To explore this possibility,we interact the tax effects with five educa-
tional attainment groups: (1) less than high school,(2) high school, (3)
some college, (4) college, and (5) post-graduate work. Table 4.4reports
the results of these interactions. In the firstrow of table 4.4, the esti-
mated coefficients on the level of themarginal tax rate across educa-
tion groups provide an example of the fragilityof the estimates of
this parameter; the estimated coefficientvaries across education
groups and is statistically different from zero only for people witha
high school education.
In contrast, the estimated effect of tax convexityis consistently nega-
tive, of roughly similar magnitudeacross education groups, and statis-
tically different from zero at the 99percent confidence level for all five
groups. In comparing the estimated effect of tax convexityamong the
education groups, the largest (in absolute value)estimated effect is for
highly educated people, thoughwe cannot reject the hypothesis that
the estimated effects are equalacross education groups. Overall, it
does not appear that the negative estimatedeffect of tax convexity is
concentrated among lower educationgroups (which one might expect













Dummy variable0.00719NA 0.000131 0.00856 0.0143
for education (0.00630) (0.00803) (0.0117) (0.0219)104 Gentry and Hubbard
V.Conclusion
Interest in the role of entrepreneurial entryin innovation raises the
question of the extent to which tax policy encourages ordiscourages
entry. We find that, while the level ofthe marginal tax rate has a nega-
tive effect on entrepreneurial entry,the progressivity of the tax also
discourages entrepreneurship, and significantly sofor some groups of
households. These effects are principallytraceable to the upside, or
success, convexity of thehousehold tax schedule.
Prospective entrants from a priori innovativeindustries and occupa-
tions are no less affected by the considerationsthat we examine than
are other prospective entrants.In terms of destination-based industry
and occupation measures of innovative entrepreneurs, wefind mixed
evidence on whether innovative entrepreneursdiffer from the general
population; the results for entrepreneurs moving toinnovative entre-
preneurs suggest that they maybe unaffected by tax convexity, but
the possible endogeneity of this measureof innovative entrepreneurs
confounds interpreting this specification. Usingeducation as a mea-
sure of potential for innovation, wefind that tax convexity discourages
entry into sell-employment for peopleof all educational backgrounds.
Overall, we find little evidence that the tax effects arefocused simply
on the employmentchanges of less-skilled or less-promisingpotential
entrants.
Three extensions are promising. The first is toinvestigate more com-
pletely which types of businesses arediscouraged by tax policy. Sec-
ond, the effects of tax policy on innovation mayalso come through
effects on an individual's willingness to pursueeducation or change
jobs or careers (see, e.g., our work in Gentryand Hubbard 2004b). The
third is to integrate tax policy effects onentrepreneurial decisions in
more general models of savings,investment, and economic growth.
Notes
This paper was prepared for presentation at the NBERConference on Innovation Policy,
Washington, DC, April 13, 2004. We thank Josh Lernerand Scott Stern for their com-
ments, and Anne Dom for research assistance.
For evidence that entrepreneurial outcomes areriskier than earnings in employment,
see Botias (1999), Hamilton (2000),and Gentry and Hubbard (2003).
We choose this setup (as opposed to examiningcross-sectional evidence about who is
an entrepreneur) because we useworkers' wage income in constructing our proxy for"Success Taxes," Entrepreneurial Entry, and Innovation 105
expected entrepreneurial outcomes. Obviously, self-employment is onlyone possible
definition of entrepreneurship. While other definitions may capturemore naturally the
notion of innovation, data constraints prevent us from using alternativemeasures.
Cullen and Gordon (2002) embed this hypothesis in a broad model of the effectsof
taxes on entrepreneurship. The general idea, however, has been common throughre-
search on taxes and self-employment.
This tax-shelter hypothesis commonly assumes that self-employment providesa tax
advantage because the taxpayer reports a smaller tax base due to underreportingincome
or taking business deductions for expenses that have a personal consumption aspect.
However, tax rate differentials between being an employee and being self-employedcan
also affect the self-employment decision lf legislated differences between thetwo em-
ployment choices exist in the tax base. For example, before 1987, the self-employed could
not deduct the cost of "employer-provided" health insurance.
Bruce (2000) summarizes this literature and estimates how entry decisions into self-
employment depend on both the marginal and average tax rates. The time-series studies
of taxes and self-employment include Long (1982a) and Blau (1987). Several studiesus-
ing household-level data (e.g., Long 1982b, Moore 1983, and Schuetze 2000) report that
higher marginal tax rates are associated with higher probabilities of self-employment. In
our empirical methodology, we control for the level of the marginal tax rate, which
should capture some of these tax-sheltering effects of self-employment.
In addition to the effects of tax rates, Cullen and Gordon's (2002) model includes the
option to incorporate, which is valuable if double taxation of corporate income reduces
the tax burden on investment relative to remaining an unincorporated business. Theop-
tion value of incorporating'depends on being able to decide on organizational form after
learning about the prospects of the business. This situation creates another form of nonli-
nearity in the tax system.
With a constant marginal tax rate, the income tax cannot change the sign of theentry
decision for a risk-neutral potential entrant. This flat-tax case is the commonly analyzed
analog to the Domar and Musgrave (1944) analysis of a proportional taxon a risky in-
vestment for risk-averse potential investors.
Noncorporate finns face similar issues because of progressive tax rates.
Our empirical methodology does not account for the effects of these loss-offset rules
because we focus on the self-employment decision, which often does not entail forming
a C-corporation that would face the corporate tax.
Theoretical predictions about the effects of tax rates on risk takingare complicated
because the tax system reduces both the mean and the variance of returns. Theoretically,
it is possible that a higher tax rate on risky outcomes wifi increase the amount of risk
taking. Domar and Musgrave (1944) wrote the seminal paper on the effects oftaxes on
risk taking.
Our empirical methodology does not incorporate the effects of capital gains taxes
because we are focusing on the self-employment decision. It is unlikely thanmany of the
types of self-employed people in our sample engage in activities financed by venture
capital. Also, one can view our methodology as capturing the tax on the returns thatare
taken as personal income (and personal consumption) before the business is sold.
Hall and Van Reenen (2000) survey the design of fiscal incentives for research and
development (R&D) and the evidence about the effectiveness of these policies. They106 Gentry and Hubbard
conclude that the evidence suggests that a dollar in tax credit stimulates an additional
dollar of R&D.
Guenther and Willenborg (1999) examine the effects of the reduced tax rate on capital
gains on initial public offerings of qualified small-business stock. In1993, Congress
reduced by half the capital gains tax on small-business (defined as having assets of less
than $50 million) stock purchased from the corporation by individuals. Guentherand
Wfflenborg find that this policy increased the price that small businesses were able to
charge for their stock, which is consistent with the tax break lowering the costof capital
for such businesses.
Tn the data, self-employment is defined by the respondent and does not require a spe-
cific organizational form. Thus, a self-employed person could work in a businessthat is
organized for legal and tax purposes in either the corporate or noncorporate form.
For three years (1984, 1989, and 1994), the PSID includes data on assetholdings,
including a category covering business assets. For this smaller sample of years, we can
calculate entry into entrepreneurship based on business ownership rather thanself-
employment. The estimated effects of tax convexity on entry into business ownership are
similar to the effects on entry into self-employment (Gentry and Hubbard2003). Because
the sample size in considerably smaller, however, the data do not lendthemselves to test-
ing whether the effects are similar across subsets of the population;hence, we define
entrepreneurship as self-employment for testing whether the effects are similar across
subsets of the population.
The omitted category is high school education.
In our earlier work (Gentry and Hubbard 2003), we conduct substantialsensitivity
analysis on this choice of functional form, with little change in the estimated coefficients
of interest.
Again, wealth data are not available on an annual basis in the PSID.
To capture the effects of wage growth, we allow eamings to grow by 5 percentin
constructing our benchmark tax rate.
Tn our earlier work (Gentry and Hubbard 2003), we relax this assumption.Our esti-
mated effects of tax convexity on the probabifity of entry are not driven much bydiffer-
ences in sex, marital status, or income group.
Our (2003) paper presents an analysis of the wage growth distribution andof alterna-
tive proxies for the convexity of the tax schedule faced by a prospective entrant.
We base this conclusion on the fact that a household's state of residence, its income
dedile, and the year under consideration do not explain much of the variationin the tax
convexity measure.
Of course, given the organization of colleges and universities, workers in these occu-
pations are unlikely to be self-employed.
While this estimated coefficient is statistically different from zero, sensitivityanalysis
in our (2003) paper suggests this result is not robust. For example, alternativefunctional
forms for controlling for income or alternative definitions of the sampleyield estimated
coefficients that change in sign and are typically not statistically different than zero.In
contrast, the estimated effects of tax convexity are robust to a wide varietyof sensitivity
tests."Success Taxes," Entrepreneurial Entry, and Innovation 107
In terms of the (unreported) nontax variables, higher levels of educationalattainment
are associated with higher entry probabilities. Once we control for education, current la-
bor earnings have a negative effect on the likelihood of entry except forvery-high-income
households. As a proxy for potential entrants' wealth, capital income positivelyaffects
the entry probability. Finally, all else being equal, minority and female headsof house-
hold are substantially less likely to enter self-employment thanare white male heads of
households.
To see how the endogeneity problem could affect the estimated coefficients,consider
the following extreme example. Suppose that tax convexity reducedthe number of
entrants into innovative occupations to zero. It would appear in the destination-baseden-
try data that the variation in tax convexity would be unrelated to the entry decisionwhen
in fact tax convexity has a large negative effect on entry into theseoccupations.
Separating households by income levels provides another possiblecategorization
that might be related to how innovative a potential entrepreneur is. Our (2003)paper
reports results for a specification that allows the tax effects tovary by income quinifie
(defined on an annual basis). These results do not suggestany strong relationship be-
tween income and the responsiveness to tax convexity.
We also estimated models in which the educationgroups interacted with upside and
downside convexity separately. The results from this expanded model didnot reveal any
strong patterns among education and the estimated effects of upsideor downside
convexity.
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